CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
EQUAL PROTECTION AND EDUCATING
ILLEGAL ALIEN CHILDREN
The constitutionality of a state statute limiting the use of state
funds for the education of children who are citizens or legally admitted aliens was subject to extensive evaluation by several Texas courts.
First challenged in Hernandez v. Houston Independent School
District,' which upheld its constitutionality, the same statute was later found unconstitutional in Doe v. Plyler. 2 Following the decision
in Plyler, numerous actions which had been instituted against other
Texas school districts were consolidated in In re Alien Children
Education Litigation. Challenged as violating the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment as well as denying fundamental
rights, the statute was again held unconstitutional.
At issue in each of these cases was an amended Texas statute 4
which granted a tuition-free public education to citizen children and

558 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (rehearing denied; writ of error refused-no
reversible error). The matter was considered on appeal from a grant of summary judgment to
the State Board of Education by the Travis County District Court. Id. Undocumented aliens
were permitted to attend school upon payment of a monthly fee. Id.
2 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978). The Board of Trustees of the Tyler Independent
School District refused to enroll any undocumented child without payment of a $1,000 tuition
fee. See Note, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 549 (1979) for a more detailed discussion of this decision.
I MDL No. 398 (S.D. Tex., July 21, 1980). To distinguish petitioners from legally admitted
or resident aliens, the court designated this group as undocumented aliens. Id. slip op. at 2.
School districts generally excluded undocumented aliens or charged a tuition fee. Id. at 12.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon 1975). The statute states:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens
and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first
day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the
Available School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally
admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21
years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall
be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or
in which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at
the time he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall
admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are
either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five
and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person of
his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.
Id.
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legally admitted aliens, and, "by negative implication," - denied this
benefit to all others. Prior to 1975, the statute 6 had provided that all
children between the ages of six and twenty-one were eligible to
attend public schools in their respective school districts. 7 At the request of the Commissioner of Education to interpret the statute, the
Attorney General determined that all children within the state,
whether legally or illegally present in the United States, were entitled to attend their resident school district public schools. 8 Subsequent to the Attorney General's opinion, the Texas legislature
amended the statute to the current reading. 9 The proposed aim of
the amended statute was to preserve the "fiscal integrity of state and
local education programs" threatened by the anticipated expense of
educating this additional population. 0
In Hernandez, the court adopted the position that the equal protection clause did not apply to illegal aliens." It assumed that even if
5 MDL

No. 398, slip op. at 2.

6 See Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 571 n.3 for complete text of the original statute.
7 MDL No. 398, slip op. at 10-11. No policy as to admission of undocumented children

had been developed prior to this time. Id.
I Id. at 11 n. 15. The court stated the opinion had been supported by "legislative intent and
a plain-meaning construction of the statute." Emphasis was placed on the word "every" to
indicate there was to be no exception to the policy by the local school boards. Id.
Id. at 11-12.
' Id. at 65.
558 S.W.2d at 123. Prior to addressing the particular issues presented in these cases, each
of the courts reviewed the procedures whereby a challenge is analyzed under the equal protection clause, and applied the pertinent level of review. Id. See MDL No. 398, slip op. at 14; 458
F. Supp. at 580. For a more extensive analysis, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mode for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
The purpose of the clause is to "measure the validity of classifications created by state laws"
to prevent discrimination by legislative classifications, and to insure equal protection of the law
to all "similarly circumstanced persons." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). See MDL No. 398, slip op. at
14. Notwithstanding the discretionary power afforded states in establishing classifications, questions arise when the classification involves one of the recognized suspect classes or affects a
fundamental right. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (prohibiting unmarried
interracial couple from living together or occupying same room violates equal protection);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (restricting certain sales on Sunday not in
violation of equal protection clause). Any such classification will be declared unconstitutional
unless it can be shown necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1968).
If the classification does not involve one of the aforementioned categories, a second level or
rational relationship test will be used. The state must then demonstrate that the classification
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest that neither arbitrarily nor invidiously
discriminates among members of the class. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1972);
Dandridge v, Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190-91
(1964).
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undocumented aliens were entitled to equal protection, in this instance they had not been denied such protection. 2 Applying the
accepted review procedures to ascertain the measure of judicial scrutiny, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no
infringement of a fundamental right and that illegal aliens were not
among those classes characterized as suspect, therefore, strict scrutiny was not required. 3 The court viewed the classification as one
based upon immigration status, not alienage, noting that alien status
was "hardly an unalterable or unchangeable one." 14
Furthermore, the Hernandez court considered education to be a
social and economic function of the states upon which the federal
government could not infringe. This function afforded Texas the
rational relationship needed to restrict the use of state funds. 5 The
court paid particular attention to the costs involved in providing
education and considered the increased financial burden as sufficient
justification to deny the admission of undocumented aliens. 6 While
acknowledging that aliens are guaranteed due process of law,1 7 the
court relied on Mathews v. Diaz "8to support the position that illegal
aliens were not entitled to all the benefits afforded citizens and certain non-citizens. 9
The identical statute was held unconstitutional in Doe v. Plyler.2
Although the policy justifications advanced for the enactment

Suggested as an intermediate level of review is a minimum rationality approach. A legislature is presumed to have acted constitutionally when establishing a classification. Only when no
legitimate purpose is found will the law be set aside. See Gunther, supra, at 17-20.
"2558 S.W.2d at 123. See Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 954 (1976) (elimination of AFDC benefits possible denial of equal protection); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare benefits conditioned upon possession of United States
citizenship or alien residency requirement not against equal protection clause).
"3558 S.W.2d at 124 n,1. The court was aware of the suggested "'heightened scrutiny" test
presented in Plyler but believed that because that finding was made in a proceeding for a
temporary injunction, it had little precedential value for any future determination by the United
States Supreme Court. Id.
4 Id. at 124.
15

Id.

16

Id. at 124-25.

Id. Rejecting the due process argument, the court found there had been no denial of life,
liberty, or property. Those cases which found denial upheld the right to due process. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1895); Bolanos v.
Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975).
"8426 U.S. 67 (1976) (regulation of welfare benefits permitted discrimination within the class
of aliens).
558 S.W.2d at 125.
458 F. Supp. at 571-74. Plaintiffs were all native Mexicans who resided in the Tyler area
for from three to thirteen years with each family having at least one preschool age child, who
was a citizen of the United States by birth.
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of legislation limiting the benefits of the " 'Available School
Fund' "2 were the prevention of the "drain on local education funds"
and the utilization of public education funds for citizens and legally
admitted aliens, the underlying rationale, as perceived by the court,
was the effective deterrence of illegal aliens from entering Texas. The
court regarded this rationale as unrelated to the purpose of the
enacted legislation.22
In urging application of the rational relationship test to uphold
the statute, the state relied on reports showing the effects the attendance of undocumented aliens had on the school districts bordering
Mexico. However, the Plyler court pointed out that similar problems
occured with legally admitted aliens of Mexican heritage who were
generally of the same socio-economic level as the undocumented
aliens and no differentiation was made by assessing a tuition
reimbursement.'
Finding the economic evaluation inaccurate and
the relationship between the Available School Fund and the quality
of education unreliable, the court noted that little correlation between cost and a decreased pupil enrollment could be shown absent a
24
significant reduction in the student population.
Although recognizing that illegal aliens were not entitled to the
same privileges as citizens and legally admitted aliens, the court, in
reaffirming an illegal alien's right of due process, agreed with Bolanos
v. Kiley 25 that "[p]eople who have entered the United States, by
whatever means, are 'within its jurisdiction' in that they are within
the territory of the United States and subject to its laws."26 The
court then proceeded to determine if, under this analysis, illegal
aliens were entitled to equal protection of the laws. In determining
which test to apply, it identified four specific reasons that justified
application of the highest level of review. Notwithstanding this analysis, the court rejected strict scrutiny and applied the rational basis
test. 21

21

Id. at 577. The Available School Fund was the money available to the local districts to

operate the education program. Sources included local, state and federal funds. Id.
2 Id. at 575-78.
2 Id. at 576. These problems included overcrowding of classes with poorly educated children, overage for their grade-level, speaking little or no English. This created the need for
bi-lingual education programs with the attendant problems of obtaining qualified personnel yet
supported by a low tax base unable to offset the increased costs. Id. at 576-77.
" Id. Removal of the sixty undocumented children attending Tyler area schools resulted in
no significant financial savings. Id.
11509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975).
1 458 F. Supp. at 579-80.
21 Id. at 585.
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While accepting the holding of San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriquez 5 that education was not a fundamental right,
the court viewed this finding to be explicitly and repeatedly limited
to the relative deprivation of education; unresolved was the possibility of a strict challenge if access had been absolutely denied." 9 In
response to the argument that this policy discriminated on the basis
of wealth, the court again looked to Rodriquez and suggested that "a
clearly defined class of poor people" might require greater judicial
attention.' The Plyler court noted that "a state 'could not, for example, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children
from its schools.' "3 Moreover, even if this act was deemed to be
social or economic regulation, the court suggested the strictest level
of review would not be required. 2 A more appropriate analogy for
affording strict review was to the decisions striking down illegitimacy
laws which penalized and stigmatized children for the acts of their
parents.3 3 Finally, rejecting the claim that illegal aliens were a suspect class or a sub-class of aliens entitled to the strict scrutiny test,
the court found they were "a separate class, for which suspect status
must be independently established."m
Additionally, the court extensively compared a California statute
which prohibited the knowing employment of illegal aliens and the
Texas statute. 35 Following an overview of federal immigration law

- 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). This case presented a challenge to the means used to finance Texas
public schools. A substantial portion of the monies used for funding education came from property taxes. The differences in taxable property values resulted in per pupil expenditures which,
arguably, disadvantaged children in poorer school districts. The state was not required to provide the same quality of education to all children since a fundamental right was not involved.
The court suggested a different question might have been presented if total deprivation of
education had been involved. Id. at 33-35, 37.
458 F. Supp. at 580.
Id. at 581 (citing Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 25 n.60).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1968). See 458 F. Supp. at 581-82.
32 458 F. Supp. at 582.
' Id. at 582-83. Most of the plaintiffs were infants when illegally brought into this country
and, therefore, could not have participated in the decision to violate United States immigration
laws. Id. at 582.
11Id. at 583.
"5Id. at 582-84. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). While an equal protection
challenge had not been raised in DeCanas, the Plyler court contended, nevertheless, it presented an opportunity for equal protection analysis. Further distinguishing DeCanas both on
the question of constitutionality of section 21.031 and the suspect class issue, they determined
that aliens were not "a suspect class when they [were] in violation of state laws or regulations
whose underlying purpose [was] in conformity with a federal objective." 458 F. Supp. at 583.
Suspectness was raised, however, by the history of abuse and exploitation suffered by aliens
which was "unrelated to the federal bases for their exclusion." Id.
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under the McCarran-Walter Act,' the court concluded that, unlike
the California statute, the Texas statute was not "intended to, nor
[did] in fact, implement any express or apparent federal objective" to
control immigration.3" It could not reasonably be suggested that the
system of charging tuition for undocumented children impeded the
flow of illegal immigration which ultimately "protect[ed] the domestic
labor market. '"3 Likewise, the tuition fee charged was higher than
the determined cost of providing education which might "be the type
of invidiously motivated state action" for which the suspect classification doctrine was designed. 39 The court maintained, however, these
considerations would be unnecessary if strict scrutiny applied automatically when a state, acting independently of the federal exclusionary purpose, accepted the presence of illegal aliens and then subjected them to discriminatory laws. °
Ultimately, the Plyler court determined those four areas were
not ones in which the Supreme Court had designated strict scrutiny
to be appropriate. In any event, since defendants' action was not
rationally related to the objective sought, strict scrutiny was
unwarranted."' Because the problems presented were not unique to
undocumented children but were the same as those presented by
legally admitted resident alien children, the court found that the
state's discrimination between legal and illegal aliens had no rational
basis to the alleged purpose of saving money."2 Although the evidence demonstrated that Mexican emigration resulted in serious
overcrowding in the border area schools augmented by the low economic status of the families involved and created an additional burden upon the local school system, exclusion of the undocumented
children was "irrational . .. and ineffectual." 43 The court advanced
the possibility that the state adjust its financing scheme to minimize
the differences between the border districts and the better-financed
districts. 44

" 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 to 1503 (1976); 458 F. Supp. at 583-84. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 limits immigration, excludes aliens without visas and makes illegal entry a criminal offense. Enacted to protect the domestic labor force, a secondary purpose is assumed to be
the reunion of alien family members. Id.
' 458 F. Supp. at 584.
3 Id. at 585.

id.
10 Id. at 583.
11 Id. at 585.
Id. at 586-89. See note 24 supra.
458 F. Supp. at 589.
Id. at 590.
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The preemption challenge presented a more difficult question for
the court to resolve. While it could not find that the statute expressly
conflicted with federal laws, Plyler focused attention on the federal
government's general interest in education, particularly that of disadvantaged children, and federal policy relative to immigration. 45
Accepting the rationale of Savage v. Jones46 that implications created
by state laws carry as much effect as express prohibitions, the court
found "[t]he Texas statute challenged here defeats the clear implications of federal laws covering both illegal aliens and education of disadvantaged children." 4' Therefore, it was held to be preempted by
federal law since the disadvantages created by permitting such a law
to be in effect could not easily be remedied, if at all, and conflicted
with the humanistic goals of federal policy.48
In re Alien Children offered the most comprehensive analysis of
the challenges raised concerning this statute,4 9 and adopted many of
the arguments advanced in Plyler. In an opinion authored by Judge
Woodrow Seals, the court analyzed the constitutionality of the statute
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
effect upon fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the
possible preemption by federal legislation in matters dealing with
41 Id. at 590-91. See 20 U.S.C. § 241(a) (1976), and the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 to 1503 (1976).
225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
'7 458 F. Supp. at 593.
Id. at 592.
'5 MDL No. 398, slip op. at 3, 4, 7-10. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation determined that the actions filed against state and local school districts throughout the state involved
similar questions of fact and consolidated pretrial proceedings in the Southern District of Texas.
Waivir proper venue, the parties agreed to a hearing by the district court on the constitutionality of the statute. The court dismissed the state's motion that the matter was one involving
predominant state interests. It also rejected plaintiff's collateral estoppel challenge based on
Plyler because, while the issues were similar, the questions presented in this consolidated action were much broader. Plyler involved the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the
Tyler Independent School District as contrasted with the state-wide constitutionality at issue
here. Plyler also involved a far fewer number of children within the class defined as undocumented. Although granting plaintiff's request to proceed as a class action, the court ruled
that the transferor courts should determine whether plaintiff's claims for damages could be
maintained as a class.
The class was defined as:
All children who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of
the scholastic year and have been or will be denied admission to the public schools
in the State of Texas on a tuition-free basis because of the alienage provisions of
Section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code.
Id. at 10. The court was satisfied that the class representatives met the requirements of Federal
Rule 23(a) and that injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) was inappropriate in this situation. Id.
Judge Seals' order granting petitioner's request for declaratory judgment and requiring the
school districts to admit these children was stayed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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immigration, and the potential conflict with federal treaties and
policies.5 Concluding that the equal protection clause encompassed
this class of plaintiffs as " 'persons within the jurisdiction' of the
state,"51 Judge Seals declared the statute to be unconstitutional. He
rejected the arguments based on preemption 52 and conflict with
federal policies but determined that access to education was a fun53
damental right which could not be infringed upon by the state.
According to Judge Seals, the statute effectively denied undocumented children admission to public schools because the school
districts were given the discretionary power to admit or deny enrollment. Although some school districts continued to educate all children within the district, most excluded undocumented children or
imposed a tuition requirement.'
The court emphasized that consideration of the statute could not focus solely on the prohibited use of
state funds since undocumented children may not be included in
assessing a district's portion of the Available School Fund.'5 Since
the statute characterized "undocumented children differently from all
other children with respect to admission to the public schools," and
had been amended after the Attorney General's opinion, the court
concluded that the amendment had been utilized by school districts
to legally "exclude undocumented children." '
Reiterating the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriquez that a
right to education was not explicitly provided by the Constitution,
the court pointed out that any law implicitly impinging upon a fundamental right was "presumptively unconstitutional. '' 7 The statute
in question absolutely deprived "the benefits of education" to some
children while providing this same opportunity to others which was a
constitutional claim not determined in Rodriquez.' Employing the

The Supreme Court, through Justice Powell, vacated the stay in order for the children of illegal
aliens to enter school in September of 1980. 49 U.S.L.W. 3133 (Sept. 9, 1980) (Powell, J., in
chambers).
MDL No. 398, slip op. at 2.
I' at 38.
Id.
Id. at 68, 78.
Id. at 86-87.
4 Id. at 12.
' Id. Funding was based on the average daily attendance of those children satisfying the age
and residency requirements. See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
MDL No. 398, slip op. at 13. The court noted that school districts which included undocumented children were penalized under the state's fiiancing scheme since they received
less money per pupil than districts which totally excluded such children. Id.
Id. at 15. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
I7
MDL No. 398, slip op. at 16.
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rationale of Yick Wo v. Hopkins " in conjunction with the dicta
adopted in Rodriquez, however, the court determined that "a right
[was] fundamental when it [was] preservative of or substantially related to other basic civil and political rights which [were] guaranteed
by the Constitution." 6 The focus of the analysis then centered on
whether a total deprivation of education warranted strict scrutiny because education was closely connected to the guaranteed rights of
speech and voting."' The evidence demonstrated that this deprivation was absolute and further showed the educational, emotional and
psychological damage62 suffered by those children who were absolutely
devoid of education.
Central to the issue of the infringement on rights, however, was
the questionable nature of petitioners' legal status. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that despite their present immigration status, petitioners would ultimately remain in this country and, as such, should
not be denied rights provided to others because these rights were
"not a function of immigration status."
Judging other services provided by the state as less vital to the
essence of government," the court stated that education could not
be viewed in the same context as economic or social welfare
legislation.64 While accepting the restraints placed on judicial interference in areas generally reserved for the legislature, the In re
Alien Children court assumed that when there was total exclusion
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1866) (illegal aliens entitled to due process).
MDL No. 398, slip op. at 17. Rodriquez evaluated the nexus between education and
freedom of speech and the right to vote. 411 U.S. at 35-36.
" MDL No. 398, slip op. at 18.
62 Id. at 22. Some children attended private schools but most could not afford the tuition
required by either the public or private schools. An insufficient number of private schools
existed to accomodate the number of children involved while the alternative schools established
did not provide a quality substitute for public schools. Id. at 22-23. Testimony offered by several child psychiatrists and psychologists stressed the psychological, educational and social detriment suffered by these children. Id. at 23-25.
Id. at 20, 23-26. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). This decision enumerated
the rights available to aliens once they had lawfully entered the country. The "entry" doctrine
recognized congressional power and authority to regulate the admission, exclusion or expulsion
of aliens relative to their immigration status but was not authorization for the courts to determine what constitutional rights were to be enjoyed by aliens, legally or illeglly present. MDL
No. 398, slip op. at 20-21. See Comment, 16 Hous. L. REv. 667 (1979) for further discussion of
this doctrine.
The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended a "one-time"
amnesty for some illegal aliens, possibly conditioned on a residency requirement. It further
suggested imposing civil and criminal penalties for those who employ illegal aliens. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 27, 1981, § A, at 1.
MDL No. 398, slip op. at 26. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (alien's entitlement to Medicare benefits may be subject to residency requirements).
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from access to an essential state function which was closely connected
to protected constitutional rights, strict scrutiny should be exercised.
Finding access to education to be a fundamental right, however, did
not require the state to provide the same qualitative enjoyment of
that right.65 Analogizing to the right to vote demonstrated that insuring access to the voting process did not require equality of result, but
only the opportunity to engage in the process because a protected
right was involved. In like manner, access to education did not involve restructuring the educational system to guarantee equal treatment but simply required a recognition of that right. Only when inequality of voting opportunity or educational training resulted from a
discriminatory or racial bias would strict judicial scrutiny be
warranted.6
The nature and extent of the scrutiny required was a further
question before the court. Assessing the state's claim that the statute
was per se permissible, the court acknowledged that a state could
categorize aliens differently from citizens when there was adequate
justification. The court stated "that undocumented aliens were not a
suspect class" even though little effort was made to remove them
once discovered, and inadequate measures were taken to prevent
their abusive exploitation.67 Categorization based on citizenship, or
lack thereof, was a matter in which the federal government had ultimate control and upon which the state could not impose restrictions.'
Comparing the due process guarantee with the equal protection
right, the In re Alien Children court reasoned that undocumented
children came within the provisions of the equal protection clause
since they were persons within the jurisdiction of the state despite
their illegal status. While distinctions may be made between citizens
and aliens, this occurred only when there was "an overriding national
interest." 69 In this instance, it was the federal right to control

6 MDL No. 398, slip op. at 27-29.
Id. See also Mobile v. Bolden, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980) (at-large electoral system did not
violate fourteenth or fifteenth amendments unless motivated by a discriminatory purpose); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec., 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state poll tax discriminated on the basis of
voter's ability to pay).
67 MDL No. 398, slip op. at 32.
Id. at 31-32 & n.42.
Id. at 33. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33 (1915). Although both decisions involved legally admitted aliens, the courts reasoned
that the fourteenth amendment included all persons in a state's jurisdiction. All were protected
from the unequal treatment by state law if there was no strong federal interest in defeating state
control.
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immigration. Judge Seals proposed that this rationale controlled when
a state engaged in regulating aliens.10
Noting that the Supreme Court had never specifically considered
the issue of an undocumented alien's entitlement to equal protection,
the court construed the decisions dealing with the due process right
afforded to undocumented aliens, to permit the conclusion that they
were likewise eligible for the equal protection privilege."' Focusing
on the language of the clause, it determined that as "persons" within
the state, undocumented aliens were bound by the laws of the state
and consequently entitled to its benefits.72 While legislation could be
narrowly construed, it could not differentiate between "persons subjected to such legislation." 73 Asserting that recognition had already
been made of the right to due process and equal protection by aliens,
even those illegally present, the court concluded illegal aliens were
entitled to protection of the amendment when subject to legislation
74
involving a fundamental right absent a compelling state interest.
When legislation allegedly discriminates on the basis of wealth,
the required conditions of an identifiable, impoverished class totally
barred from state economic or social welfare benefits must be found.
The evidence in In re Alien Children revealed a definable class of
persons, generally indigent, who could not afford the tuition imposed;
therefore, the statute discriminated on the basis of wealth. 75 Application of strict scrutiny was permissible since this deprivation was
viewed as similar to the restrictions on the ability to vote and the
right to a full defense in criminal prosecution." "Equal protection
did not imply the abolition of differences created by wealth" but
rather, insured opportunity to obtain state services, not based on
one's ability to pay.7
Reviewing two other arguments presented by plaintiffs, the court
first observed that this classification punished children for abuses
committed by their parents, a position inconsistent with our concept of justice.' Thus, the statute was unconstitutional since, such
'0MDL No. 398, slip op. at 33-34 & n.45.
11 Id. at 35. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1975); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886); note 17 supra. Legislative history of the fourteenth amendment provided additional
support for this interpretation. MDL No. 398, slip op. at 35. See note I supra and accompanying text.
72 MDL No. 398, slip op. at 37.
73 Id.

Id. at 34-38.
15Id. at 39.
76 Id. at 41.
77 Id. at 42-43.
74

78

Id. at 43-44.
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classification was deemed impermissible unless "substantially related"
to a state interest which was more important than one which satisfied
use of the rational relationship test.79 Responding second to the claim
of discrimination because of national origin, the court found that the
statute was formulated on the basis of immigration status, not alienage, since no evidence existed that Hispanic aliens were subject to
greater supervision than other illegal aliens. 80 Therefore, this statute
was not unconstitutional since classification was not based on any particular national heritage.
Evaluation next centered on the state's three arguments: the
large number of undocumented children potentially eligible for school
attendance, the resulting fiscal impact on the state school funds, and
the effect upon the quality of bilingual education and desegregation
efforts. Asserting that the equal protection clause did not apply to
undocumented aliens, the state argued that even invidious discrimination was permissible or, alternately, that a rational basis existed for
the statute.8'
Although few studies were conducted by the state to bolster the
position adopted, those that were concentrated primarily on "the impact and number of documented Mexican children. ' 82 The studies
indicated that the border districts were affected by the increased
number of pupils, by the inability to finance new construction, and
by the difficulty in obtaining sufficient, qualified personnel. Acknowledging the existence of these problems, the court found them to
have resulted from the addition of documented aliens as well as undocumented children."
Reviewing the Criterion Studym relied on by the state, the court
negated the findings in several instances. The major fault was the
assumption that a child not enrolled in school was an undocumented
alien when he or she might just as easily have been a documented
child. This was supported by evidence which showed there had been

' See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1979) (state had rational interest in classifying children as illegitimates).
MDL No. 398, slip op. at 44.
" Id. at 45.
id. at 45-46. Experts concurred there was no conclusive estimate of the number of undocumented aliens, including children, in the United States. Id. at 48.
m Id. at 47.
The Criterion Study calculated the number of Hispanic children in all schools and among
school dropouts. It then subtracted the documented Hispanic school age population from the
census figure for all five to seventeen year old Hispanics in Texas. The remaining number was
the " 'potential undocumented Hispanic school age population.' " Id. at 48-49. (quoting Criterion Study).
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no increase in the number of nonenrolled children following adherence to the statute.'
In addition, the study used two different data
bases, the Texas Education Association study (TEA) and the 1970
census count, which reflected different numbers thereby creating
questionable reliability. 6 Furthermore, there were four general
problem areas: designating school drop-outs as "potential undocumented children" when by definition they would not re-enroll;
excluding documented five and six year olds not yet in school which
would reduce the "potentially undocumented" by one-half; utilizing a
census figure which overcounted Hispanic children; and basing con7
clusions on an estimate of children not in school.1
The In re Alien Children court rejected the state's argument
that the availability of free education would encourage emigration of
undocumented aliens. The court found this to be a clear indication of
the state's true purpose of reducing the flow of illegal immigration
which was unacceptable and at variance with the federal prerogative
to regulate immigration.'
The state argued that the increased cost would result in a decline
in the quality of education or that better use could be made of the
money, but the evidence showed there were sufficient funds available
to meet the increased enrollment.8 The court suggested a more
accurate measurement of the number involved was needed to assess
necessary expenditures.
Admitting that genuine problems existed in a number of school
districts ranging from inadequate school buildings to insufficient reimbursement for appropriate salary levels, the court found, nevertheless, the state's solution in excluding children to be excessively harsh.
Dismissing the state's claim that inclusion of undocumented children
would affect bilingual programs and segregation plans, the court
asserted that bilingual education was funded primarily by the federal

's Id.

s Id. at 50.
'7 Id. at 51-52. The court accepted a study conducted by Dr. Jorge Bustamante, a noted
expert in the area of Mexican immigration, which determined that there are approximately
20,000 undocumented children in Texas. Id. at 52-53.
' Id. at 53. Judge Seals concurred with the general belief that the major reason for immigration was job opportunities, not the availability of educational or social services. Id. at 54.
" Id. at 55. Examination of appropriations for educational financing revealed funding from
the following sources: consumer taxes, notably sales taxes, the General Revenue Fund, the
Omnibus Tax Clearance Fund, the Highway Motor Fund, and the Permanent Escrow Fund.
Each have a surplus adequate to cover the required costs. Id. at 56-57. Petitioners contributed
to these funds through payments of taxes. Id. at 40.
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government and that the claimed effect upon desegregation was without supporting evidence.'
While accepting the state's argument that fiscal integrity is an
important and legitimate state interest, the court held "that absolute
deprivation of education should trigger strict scrutiny, particularly
when the absolute deprivation is the result of complete inability to
pay for the desired benefit." 9 ' A policy based solely on state fiscal
integrity was not a compelling state interest. Furthermore, no evidence showed that the exclusion of children would improve the quality of education or that the classification advanced the state's interest.
In essence, it was based on federal immigration status, not as a result
of the state's announced policy, since "[n]othing about their immigration status by itself distinguishes them from other children in terms
of their educational needs.""
The argument based on federal preemption centered on interpretation of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 (Title I) and the Title I Migrant Program (Migrant
Program).'
The court did not regard the purpose of Title I as preventing states form involvement in this field since the education of a
disadvantaged group had not been exclusively reserved to the federal
government.'
Without benefit of the legislative history of section
21.031, a legitimate purpose was assumed, and the court recognized
that "[e]ducation [was] a matter of state and local concern under the
police powers." '
Additionally, the court examined the Migrant
Program and its relevancy to this category of individuals, noting that
"[n]othing in the law or its regulations distinguishes between
documented and undocumented children." '
Consequently, Texas received money from the federal government to educate children excluded from school; however, Title I did

o Id. at 56-59. See United States v. Texas, 46 U.S.L.W. 2470-71 (E.D. Tex., Jan. 12, 1981).
In this decision, Texas' failure to provide bilingual education programs for Mexican-American
children was found to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
" MDL No. 398, slip op. at 60.
92 Id. at 61-62. Failure by the state to determine the impact before exclusion weighed
heavily in the court's rationalization that strict security was warranted. Id.
' Title I, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2854
(1976); Title I Migrant Program, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2761 to 2763 (1976).
MDL No. 398, slip op. at 64.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66. Under the Title I formula, the number of children five to seventeen in below
poverty level families as determined in the 1980 census was multiplied by a percentage of per
pupil expenditures, resulting in the amount returned to the state. The Migrant Program
attempted to identify all migrant children in each state for inclusion in federal funds since
funding was based on the actual number found in each state. Id. at 66-67.
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not preempt the challenged statute because a state may regulate
education. Compliance with both was possible since the state law did
not specifically violate federal legislation. Furthermore, Title I was
designed to provide supplemental funds to local programs because
the formula identified "schools containing significant numbers of educationally deprived students, not specific children, and was a voluntary program which, by its very nature, cannot be preempted."";
Rejection of the statute was urged on the basis of its conflict with
United States treaty obligations, specifically those articles dealing
with education. The court found the treaties were not self-executing
or intended by Congress to be domestic law but merely encouraged
the development of education as a mutual goal. 98
United States foreign policy and its recognized support of full
development of human rights and human potential, including educational opportunity, was not of sufficient force to override state law. 99
Recognizing the inconsistency in permitting the existence of this statute, the court, nevertheless, examined the intent of the signers and
supporters of various international documents and found it to be an
attempt to achieve desired goals but without the force of law. The
court considered it inappropriate to act in an area in which the federal government, the "one voice [entitled to speak] in our dealings with
foreign governments and international organizations," had not
acted. 1" The state's action did not conflict with federal policy.
The court quickly dismissed plaintiff's claim under customary international law. Asserting that education for all was a recognized international goal, nonetheless, it "has not acquired the status of international law."'01
In concluding, the court stressed that the right to education was
the central issue of this decision. "Absent sufficient justification, the
Constitution does not permit the states to deny access to education to
a discrete group of children within its borders when it has undertaken to provide public education."'
Acknowledging the great social cost that exclusion produced both to these particular children and
to society at large, Judge Seals held "that access to education [was] a
fundamental right" which was unconstitutionally infringed upon by
implementation of this statute. 1°3
", Id. at 68-70.
91Id.
" Id.
101Id.
101Id.
101Id.
10 Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

73-75.
75-83.

83.
84-85.
86.
86-87.
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Faced with the prospect of extending the equal protection provision of the fourteenth amendment to illegal aliens, two courts chose
to extensively evaluate past decisions and implications relative to this
privilege and to recognize its applicability to this discrete class, while
one court chose to avoid the challenge. The Hernandez court merely
reiterated the general policy of the clause, while entertaining no
analysis regarding the applicability of the fourteenth amendment to
the classification at issue simply because the Supreme Court had not
yet spoken on inclusion of illegal aliens."° Rather, it accepted the
position of the district court without reviewing any decisions interpreting suspect classifications or fundamental rights. To compound
the irrationality of its position, the court assumed that even if such
protection were recognized, in this instance no right had been
violated but the court did not engage in any effort to investigate the
basis of the challenge. 1 5
A crucial factor in the court's determination was the anticipated
additional cost to the school system. Little evidence, however, was
introduced to demonstrate the accuracy of this claim. It was based on
an hypothesis that an increase in the assessment ratio of property
values would be needed which, when voted upon by the local community, would not be approved. Thereupon, funds to provide education for undocumented children would have to come from the
appropriations for existing services, resulting in a reduction of those
services." 6 Unlike the other decisions, no investigation was conducted to determine if adequate funds were currently available and
no estimate was made of the number of children within the class to
show the actual costs that would be incurred. The justification for the
denial of equal protection, concern that a presumed scenario would
occur, is unwarranted since it provides no legal foundation for the
holding. It could just as easily be presumed that a more favorable
vote would be cast.
The Plyler court extensively assessed the essential issues, thereby providing the foundation for the In re Alien Children decision.
Throughout the major portion of the decision, the Plyler court
appeared to be leaning towards affirmance of strict scrutiny. Instead,
without having clear cut Supreme Court precedent for the highest
level of review in the four principal areas considered, the court relied
on the state's failure to establish a rational basis for the statute.'o7
101558
10 Id.

S.W.2d at 123.

101Id. at 125.
" 458 F. Supp. 569.

19811
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Both In re Alien Children and Plyler found a distinct class of
poor, whose children were absolutely deprived of access to education.
While agreeing that education could be viewed as social and economic legislation by the state, the Plyler court distinguished this service
based on the absolute denial of a state-operated service. The court
compared this denial with the relative deprivation found in decisions
dealing with state benefits, but stopped short of establishing education as a fundamental right. 108 The failure to recognize access to
education as a fundamental right is curious in view of the court's
willingness to distinguish other decisions in the social/economic area,
and the extensive attention accorded the Rodriquez opinion. This
may, nevertheless, have targeted the pivotal area on which the In re
Alien Children court later based the foundation of its holding.
The court's strongest argument was directed towards the state's
failure to prohibit the employment of illegal aliens while at the same
time imposing a burden on one segment of this group, present within
the state due to the state's benign attitude toward illegal hiring
practices." ° Certainly this was a blatant example of abuse and exploitation, and at the very least, a clear demonstration of the inconsistency of the state's position.
Plyler also emphasized that the state's position that the use of
state funds should be limited to the education of citizens and legally
admitted aliens was merely a reaffirmation of the law but did not
provide the rational basis needed for its enactment."' Because both
documented and undocumented Mexican aliens demonstrated the
same educational needs, any additional expenses would be equally
incurred by both groups. The court suggested that the state's goal
would be more adequately effectuated by excluding all Mexican
immigrants. "' Such a position would, without doubt, be unconstitutional. Should a rational relationship then be found merely because of
one group's immigration status?
The fundamental issue for this court was the burden imposed on
established residents, albeit residents in violation of federal immigration laws, by the legislation which conflicted with federal immigration
laws. Reliance on the preemption argument seems misplaced at best
since the federal government had already adopted the position that
the statute was not invalid under the federal preemption doctrine." 2
"0 MDL No. 398, slip op. at 22, 39; 458 F. Supp. at 580-82. See 426 U.S. at 80; 411 U.S. at
18-44; 397 U.S. at 483-87.
'
458 F. Supp. at 584-85.
"' Id. at 586.
Id. at 589.
"'
Id. at 573, 590-91.
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Nevertheless, the decision reflects an attempt to deal with a difficult
problem in a manner that is both legally and morally correct.
In re Alien Children concurred with Plyler that illegal aliens
were indeed persons within the state's jurisdiction and therefore, entitled to the full protection of the fourteenth amendment. 3 They
took the further step of establishing a new fundamental right which
had clearly been violated by this statute and, as such, warranted the
highest level of judicial scrutiny." 4 Judge Seals concluded that undocumented aliens enjoyed the right to equal protection primarily on
the basis of their established right to due process."' He appeared to
have employed a two-step approach in view of no clear precedent for
this position. First recognizing that illegal aliens were entitled to due
process protection," 6 he then evaluated the legally admitted alien's
right to equal protection." 7 From this he inferred that illegal aliens
enjoyed that same right since their status was one of an alien despite
the questionable manner of their entry into the state. In addition, he
accepted the premise that the two branches of the fourteenth amendment co-exist and should be applied together." 8 This approach was
neither unrealistic nor illogical even though unsupported by case law.
Entitlement to rights belonged to an individual, regardless of the
manner or form of how the individual came to be present within a
specific area. "'
Although giving credence to the illegal aliens' right to equal protection, the court's avoidance of viewing this group as a suspect class
was reflective of a trend away from measuring legislative classifications of aliens with a strict scrutiny level of review. 0 Therefore,
without a more significant justification the court probably could not
have adopted the equal protection rationale. Only by linking that
entitlement to a fundamental right could the statute be declared

"I MDL No. 398, slip op. at 38. See Comment, 16 Hous. L. REV. 667 (1979) for a discussion
of standards to be applied to illegal aliens.
"4 MDL No. 398, slip op. at 38.
H Id. at 34-35.
"6 Id. at 34. See notes 17 & 71 supra.
". In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1895);
Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975).
.. MDL No. 398, slip op. at 36, 38. "The due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment apply to aliens within the United States, and even to aliens whose
presence here is illegal." 509 F.2d at 1025. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1953)
(equal protection and due process based on fundamental fairness and were not " 'mutually
exclusive' ").
". MDL No. 398, slip op. at 20, 63.
" Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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unconstitutional and the equal protection analysis apply. 2' This suggests why the court designated access to education as the focal point
of the decision, and why, unlike the Plyler holding, preemption by
federal regulation alone was insufficient to strike down the statute in
view of allowing some state regulation of aliens. 2
It should be noted that this decision did not establish substantive
rights through its recognition of the equal protection privilege but
clearly stated that any rights claimed by illegal aliens will still be
subject to evaluation under the fundamental rights analysis.' 2 3
Moreover, it in no way suggests that all rights enjoyed by citizens
will henceforth be applicable to all others. Judicial review will still be
needed to assess the rights claimed.
The state's concern for fiscal integrity was not compelling or
rational. However, the court did not disparage the genuine problems
faced by the state's educational system, nor deny that some adverse
financial impact had been created. 124 One of the most difficult obstacles for the state to overcome was the unreliable estimate of the number of children involved. The court rightfully made a thorough review
of the studies used and concluded they should be viewed with disfavor. An unbiased, reliable data base was essential to the state's
case, and failure to offer sufficient justification dispelled the claim of a
25
compelling or rational interest.'
Nonetheless, the state raised many questions which remain unanswered. Admitting as true the statement that illegal aliens only enter this country for the economic opportunity, it is difficult to accept
the claim that they have no interest in the other benefits available in
this society.'2 Presumably, anyone migrating with a family comes for
the total good of the family. They come to remain, hope for pardon
of their illegal status, and desire to ultimately become part of this
"' Cf. United States v. Otherson, 480 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (civil rights protection
afforded to illegal aliens under "inhabitants" language of the civil rights statute).
The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly extends the equal protection and due
process of law to all " 'persons' ". The law is well settled that these protections
apply to all people within the jurisdiction of the United States, whether here legally
or otherwise.
Id. at 1374.
" See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (citizenship requirement for public school
teachers had rational relationship to legitimate state interest); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1977) (resident alien ineligible for appointment to state police force); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1975) (classification between class of aliens not in violation of due process).
MDL No. 398, slip op. at 16-17.
ld. at 55-62.
Iz
'z' Id. at 48-53.
l Id. at 54.
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society. It is difficult to believe that recognition of this benefit will
not serve as an inducement for others desirous of improving the economic standard of living for all their family members to attempt illegal
entry.
Additionally, although funds are currently available, will this continue to be the situation? If this decision encourages more family
migration, will there come a time when funds are no longer available,
unlike the present circumstances? Who then will pay? As Judge Seals
noted, Texas ranks forty-second in expenditures per child for education. Perhaps an increase in this amount should be made to better
improve the quality of education for those currently attending school
rather than, even modestly, decreasing the amount presently being
expended.
The problems presented in this challenge were primarily
sociological rather than legal. The question of equal protection was of
minimal significance since clearly this group comes within the language of the equal protection clause. Rather, it was the question of
the irreparable harm caused to innocent victims versus the burden
imposed upon the public school system to resolve one of the most
complex problems faced by society today. Requiring the Texas school
system to accept this burden in light of an existing state policy
apparently unwilling to provide the necessary monetary support is
not the answer. Fiscal responsibility to the total citizenry is also of
equal importance, and the economic costs cannot be discounted. But
basic rights essential to our way of life cannot be trammeled when
other means exist to limit the scope of the problem. Discouraging
employment opportunities, arranging penalties for employers who
profit from the benefits of cheap labor, providing a more equalized
share of state revenues to the school system along with increasing
federal awareness and attention to the difficulties faced by the state,
although not eradicating, should minimize the extent of the problem.
Mary Virginia Sullivan

